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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper compares the experience of the two countries in Europe with the most 
experience of passenger rail service franchising – Britain and Sweden. It examines the 
nature of the contracts between the franchising authority and the franchisee, and between 
the franchisee and the infrastructure manager with a particular emphasis on the incentives 
provided, the degree to which the franchisee has freedom of action on issues such as 
fares, service levels and the provision of rolling stock and the sharing of risks. It 
concludes that the Swedish approach works well in a context in which decisions on fares 
and service levels are largely determined by the franchising authority. The British 
approach is more problematic, in that it seeks to leave the franchisee more freedom in 
these matters, but it is doubtful whether the incentives are fully effective. Longer 
franchise periods are a part of a possible strategy to improve incentives.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Britain and Sweden are the two European countries with the longest experiences of rail 
sector reform. In Sweden, the process started with the split of infrastructure from 
operations in 1988. In Britain, separation occurred in 1994.  
 
At the time of writing, the Swedish state-owned company, SJ AB,  still has monopoly 
control over commercial passenger services although this is due to end shortly. The first 
subsidised services were franchised out in 1989 and most but yet not all subsidised 
services are now franchised out, regional services by the respective regional authorities 
and national ones by a national body, Rikstrafiken. SJ AB  submits bids for non-
commercial train services and remains the dominant operator. 
 
In Britain, virtually all rail passenger services, commercial or subsidised, were franchised 
out over the period 1994-7. With the exception of the main franchises in Scotland, Wales, 
Greater London and Merseyside, which are devolved to the national or local authorities, 
responsibility for all franchises rests with the Department for Transport in London. The 
state-owned operator, British Rail, was not permitted to bid for franchises and thus 
ceased to exist as an operator. Open access entry on commercial services is permitted 
subject to the regulator being convinced that these are to the benefit of passengers and not 
primarily abstracting revenue from franchised operators. 
 
A number of previous papers have considered separately the experience of these 
countries, most recently Smith, Nash and Wheat (2009) and Alexandersson and Hulten 
(2007). Our particular aim in this paper is to compare the two systems with respect to 
their ability to deliver transport services efficiently. Particular focus is on the design of 
franchises in the two countries in terms of the way contracts are awarded, the details of 
the contract and in particular the incentives given with respect to cost prudence, pricing 
and quality of service.  
 
Of course it must be acknowledged that there are major differences between the rail 
systems of the two countries. Whilst Britain has some 50% more rail route kilometres 
than Sweden, it carries four times the level of passenger traffic (Swedish railways 
however carry more freight than Britain). As will be seen from the appendices, many of 
the Swedish franchises are as small as 1m train km per annum, whereas in Britain, only 
one of the locally let ones (London Overground) is as small as this, and the largest (Cross 
Country) runs 50m train km per annum. These differences must obviously be borne in 
mind when making comparisons.  
 
In order to establish lessons in terms of what works best in securing value for money 
from rail services, section 2 starts by providing a picture of the aggregate performance of 
the respective industries in terms of prices, ridership and subsidies. Section 3 considers 
the overall organisationof the tendering process in the two countries. We then consider in 
turn the nature of the contract, fares regulation, rolling stock procurement and relations 
with the infrastructure manager before reaching our conclusions.   
 
 
2. OVERALL PERFORMANCE 
 
This section is designed to review some descriptive qualities of importance to understand 
the nature of services as well as their aggregate performance in the respective countries.  
 
The most obvious measures of success are the volume of traffic and cost. Figure 1 
provides a picture of rail travel growth in Sweden between 1980 and 2007. Regional 
traffic has increased by 117%, and long distance services by 22% over the period, making 
for an average of 46% for the system as a whole. Most of this growth occurred after the 
reforms. In 2007, 59% of this traffic was on long distance trains.  
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Figure 1: Rail passenger traffic in Sweden 
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Fig 2: rail passenger traffic in Britain 
 
 
Figure 2 shows a rather similar picture for Britain for the period post privatisation, 
although in Britain the fastest growth has been in the London commuter market and the 
slowest for regional services. Of course this growth cannot be attributed wholly or even 
mainly to rail reform – other factors including the state of the economy and the cost and 
journey times for motoring are more important (Wardman, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
picture on traffic growth appears to be one of success in both countries. Moreover, both 
countries now appear to be operating reliably, with more than 90% of passenger trains 
arriving on time (i.e. within 5 minutes for Sweden; within 5 minutes for regional and 
commuter services and 10 minutes for long distance services in Britain), although in the 
aftermath of the Hatfield rail accident and the bankruptcy of Railtrack, punctuality in 
Britain had been extremely poor. 
 
What has been the implication of the combination of reform and of traffic growth for the 
cost to the taxpayer? In both countries there has been a large expansion in terms of state 
funding of the infrastructure manager. But in terms of the effects of franchising the 
results seem to have been very different. For Sweden, Alexandersson and Hulten (2007) 
conclude that the first round of franchising achieved reductions in subsidy of the order of 
20-30%, and that these savings have been broadly maintained. For Britain, changes in 
track access charges and the split of subsidies between train operating companies and the 
infrastructure manager make simple comparisons of subsidy levels confusing, but whilst 
there was also a reduction in costs in the early years of franchising, train operating costs 
per train km are now 15% higher in real terms than at the start of the franchising process 
(Smith, Nash and Wheat, 2009). Thus there is some evidence that the approach to 
franchising in Sweden has worked better than that in Britain. This is a key motivation for 
the current research. 
 
 
3. ORGANISATION OF TENDERING PROCESS 
 
In Britain, the process of franchising is a two part process (DfT, 2006). In the first stage, 
invitations are issued to prequalify. At this stage, bidders have to submit evidence that 
they are capable of providing the services in question. From those pre qualifying, a short 
list is drawn up, who are then invited to tender, in terms of the subsidy they will require 
or the premium they will be willing to pay for each year of the franchise in order to 
provide a specified level of service. The winner is then selected on the basis of the most 
favourable financial offer in terms of discounted present value, but on the basis of the 
DfT forecast of what will happen to costs and revenue rather than that of the bidder. 
Deliverability is also a key issue; bidders are required to produce robust delivery plans, 
and if the most favourable financial bid is seen as too risky then it will not be selected.  
 
Whoever wins the franchise takes over an existing train operating company (TOC) and its 
staff.  This makes for easier entry and a smoother transition, but puts less competitive 
pressure on the staff than if the operator has the chance to bring in its own staff. Rail 
passenger services were initially franchised out over the period 1995-7, mainly on 7 year 
franchises, and as 25 train operating companies. The Strategic Rail Authority intended to 
move to much longer franchises, but in the event only a few such franchises were let. The 
current pattern is again seven year franchises, with an option to extend for a further three. 
There are now 20 such franchises (see Appendix A for details).  
 
British franchises specify quite tightly the services to be provided and regulate some fares 
(see below). Other franchise conditions go into great detail concerning such things as the 
amount, quality and capacity of rolling stock to be used and include conditions (generally 
based on what was offered in the franchise bid) regarding many issues such as staff 
training, station improvements and upgrade of car parks. 
 
There are a number of performance indicators monitored by the DfT, relating to 
reliability, punctuality and capacity provided. In the latest franchise, Southern, an index 
of passenger satisfaction as revealed by surveys is included.  If performance is below a 
stipulated benchmark, the TOC will be warned and required to develop a plan for 
remedial action. If the situation remains unsatisfactory, then ultimately the franchise can 
be taken away. 
 
In Britain, currently active in the market are nine groups: National Express, Firstgroup, 
Arriva, Stagecoach, Virgin, MTR, Govia , SERCO/Nedrail and Deutsche Bahn. Table 1 
shows their ownership. It will be seen that the market is dominated by British companies, 
many of which originated as bus companies, and foreign state owned railways. With only 
one or two exceptions there has always been enough interest for DfT to shortlist at least 
three groups to produce full bids. 
 
Table 1- Ownership of British Train Operating Companies 
Group                       Owners   Nature of Company  Nationality 
National Express National Express Private, bus and rail  British 
Firstgroup  Firstgroup  Private bus and rail  British 
Arriva   Arriva   Private bus and rail  British 
Stagecoach  Stagecoach  Private bus and rail  British 
Virgin   Virgin   Private rail and air  British 
MTR   MTR   Public rail   Hong Kong 
Govia   Go ahead  Private bus and rail  British 
   Via rail  Public rail   France 
SERCO/NEDRAIL     Serco   Private, utility   British 
   Nedrail  Public rail   Netherlands 
Deutsche Bahn DBAG   Public rail   Germany 
  
 
The prequalification and award process is similar in Sweden to that in Britain. As 
indicated by appendix B, there are now 22 contracts in operation. One of these services 
has been subsidised for several years but in 2009 SJ took it into its commercial net. Three 
of the contracts are tendered by Rikstrafiken and the rest by regional authorities which 
receive financial support from Rikstrafiken for those services which are considered to 
provide interregional services except for their regional component. There are still five 
negotiated contracts, three of them being assigned to SJ at the time of the 1988 separation 
of operations from infrastructure. Two of these (in Gothenburg) are now being 
announced for open bidding.  
 
Contracts are for between three and up to 12 years, but virtually all seem to have an 
option clause for additional years which is typically triggered. Except for price, different 
dimensions of quality also play an important role for assigning the contracts. There are 
examples of appeals against the awarded contracts, inter alia questioning the way in 
which quality has been measured. 
 
There are a couple of examples of tenders which have received only two bids, but in 
particular for the larger contracts four and more bids have been submitted in the final 
bidding round. Table 2 provides information about ownership of the respective operators. 
SJ is fully owned by the government. Together with People travel group, a subsidiary of 
Veolia otherwise primarily operating airport coach services, SJ also owns Merresor. 
There are, thus, ultimately six active bidders in the market. SJ, the government-owned 
incumbent, is by far the largest  In addition, the Danish and Norwegian government-
owned incumbents have a toehold on the market. So have also the private operators 
FirstGroup, Arriva and Veolia. 
 
 
 
 
 Owner 1 Owner 2 
SJ AB (the 
incumbent) 
The Swedish government  
Tågkompaniet NSB (the Norwegian 
government) 
 
Merresor SJ AB (50%)  People travel group (50%, owned 
by Veolia) 
Arriva Private, UK  
Öresundståg DSBFirst (100%) DSB (the Danish government) and 
FirstGroup 
Stockholmståg SJ, possibly with ISS and 
EuroMaint 
 
Roslagståg DSB (more than 50%)  Tågkompaniet (less than 50%) 
Veolia Private, France  
Norrlandståg SJ AB  
Table 2.  Ownership of the Swedish Train Operating Companies 
 
 
Whoever wins a franchise has to set up their own organisation and recruit staff to run it. 
In practice, this typically means that the staff of the previous operator is hired, not least in 
view of that drivers currently are in short supply; training a new driver for passenger 
operations takes about 18 months. It is still up to the new operator to decide about 
staffing and organisation of the service.  
 
Even though SJ obviously dominates the market in Sweden, and though other bidders 
predominantly are large national parastatals or private groups, it seems to be fair to say 
that the competitive pressure is substantial in both countries. The literature has never 
fully landed in an agreement over how many bidders are required to make for an 
acceptable degree of competition. However, it seems to be acknowledged that the savings 
in costs when the number of bids increase beyond three is not very large. Moreover, all 
bidders are aware of that they face highly competent adversaries in the contest, meaning 
that there is a constant need to deliver competitive bids.  
 
 
4. NATURE OF THE CONTRACT 
 
British franchises are generally essentially net cost contracts, with franchisees carrying all 
cost risks except for general inflation and changes in track access charges. Originally 
franchisees bore all revenue risk as well, but now this is shared (see below). The main 
exception to this is the London overground contract, for which TfL (Transport for 
London) is responsible. As this is closely integrated with the London underground and 
bus networks, and shares their ticketing system, it is a gross cost contract with 
performance incentives. Fares and services are completely specified by TfL. The 
following discussion does not apply to the London overground franchise. 
 
In the first round of franchises, a number of franchisees got into difficulties. At that time, 
revenue was buoyant but they failed to reduce costs as fast as anticipated. So the 
problems were mainly in the Regional sector, where revenue is small compared with 
costs. At that time, a franchisee could in these circumstances ask for a viability review in 
order to make the case for more subsidy, or withdraw from the franchise. British TOCs 
may surrender a franchise at any time, but they will be charged the costs of refranchising 
from a performance bond they have to put up when the franchise is awarded (currently 
5.5% of operating costs). However if they do surrender one franchise, they may be 
required to give up any others that they hold. This is however a two edged sword; if 
several franchises were given up by several of the large groups, this could lead to the 
return of almost all the franchises to the government in a short period of time. 
 
If a franchisee wishes to withdraw, the government has a choice of renegotiation or of 
running the franchise itself (it has a call off contract with a rail management consultancy 
to provide the necessary management expertise in this event). Whichever of these it 
chooses, it may regard this as a temporary arrangement pending refranchising, or as a 
longer term solution. Whichever it chooses, it obviously involves increased costs, and 
reletting a franchise in circumstances in which the previous franchisee got into 
difficulties is hardly likely to yield as attractive a bid. In practice, the decision has usually 
been to renegotiate, as offering the least cost solution, but there are worries that this 
contributed to a lack of cost control.  The Department for Transport has stated that its 
policy now is that companies who cannot meet their responsibilities under their franchise 
agreement will have to surrender the franchise; it will not renegotiate.  
 
Currently, it is revenue risk that is of more concern than cost risk. The argument for 
making franchisees bear revenue risk is obviously to give them an incentive to attract 
revenue by the quality of their services, fares policy and marketing. These incentives are 
more effective on commercial services, where revenue is high relative to costs, than on 
heavily subsidised ones, where there will be a much stronger incentive to hold down 
costs even if it loses revenue. As a result, whether the contract is gross or net, additional 
incentives may be required on heavily subsidised services. The gross cost contracts in 
Sweden often have some form of performance payment or revenue sharing agreement. 
The net cost contracts in Britain still are accompanied by performance monitoring and 
penalties as described in section 2 above.  Earlier franchises in Britain also incorporated 
various incentive payments but these have been abandoned as too complex. 
 
In the current economic situation, revenue growth is falling short of that expected, and it 
must be expected that some franchisees on net cost contracts will get into difficulty. This 
time the difficulty will be more acute in the sectors which rely most on revenue growth to 
meet their targets – i.e. long distance and London and South East services in Britain – and 
especially those that have recently been refranchised with ambitious revenue targets 
leading to bids involving paying a large premium to the government rather than receiving 
subsidy, and where the possibility of revenue support (see below) is still some years 
away. Some cuts in staffing have already occurred, including removal of restaurants from 
all National Express East Anglia and many National Express East Coast services, and one 
operator – National Express East Coast – has warned that it may have to withdraw from 
the franchise later in the year. 
 
In the early franchises, the franchisee carried the entire revenue risk. In recent franchises 
the risk is shared with the DfT as follows: 
 
• Revenue Share. If actual revenue out-turns between 102% and 106% of target 
revenue, then 50% of the excess between 102% and 106% will be shared with 
DfT. If it out-turns above 106%, then 80% of the further excess will be shared 
with DfT. 
• Revenue Support. If actual revenue out-turns between 98% and 94% of target 
revenue, then DfT will provide support equivalent to 50% of the shortfall between 
98% and 94%. If it out-turns below 94%, then DfT will provide support 
equivalent to 80% of the further shortfall. Revenue support arrangements usually 
only apply after the first four years of the franchise.  
 
Obviously, if a franchise were to operate under these revenue sharing arrangements, and 
in particular where its share of any increased revenue is limited to 20%, the incentives 
provided by a net cost contract would be greatly weakened. Given that the prime cause of 
external revenue risk is the state of the economy, it would be more satisfactory in terms 
of incentives to provide additional support when GDP growth fell below forecast, and 
vice versa. 
 
The basic structure of Swedish contracts is tied to the idea of a public sector procurer 
who wants to have a particular activity delivered by a commercial operator. For this 
reason, the invitation to tender provides a detailed account of the service to be run, and 
the operator is given little latitude to make changes to the way in which operations are 
handled. Two parts of this concept are that vehicles are owned by the franchising 
authority and that fares are not levied by the operator; more on these two aspects below.  
 
The contract therefore requires the operator to run the trains according to a set timetable. 
It typically also includes on-board services (ticketing and catering), although there is at 
least one example where catering has been awarded separately from operations. The 
assignment also includes vehicle maintenance, although there is also in this an example 
where it is handled by a separate agent. 
 
In Sweden, the first of the entrants – BK Tag – became bankrupt in 2005. The operator of 
last resort is SJ, which took over the failed service through its subsidiary, Mertåg. In the 
early 1990s, SJ was itself accused of placing unprofitable bids to retake and retain 
franchises, and was found guilty and fined by the Competition Authority in one such case 
in 2000. SJ was close to bankruptcy in 2002, one alleged reason being that it had won 
contracts for non-commercial services on bids below its own costs. The state had to bail it 
out from these by way of a capital infusion. 
 
Although the contracts basically are of a gross cost nature, tendering authorities try to 
provide incentives for bidders and for the subsequent operator to contribute to quality, 
marketing etc. Contracts only rarely are awarded based on lowest cost only. Although 
quality criteria are notoriously difficult to gauge at the awarding date, they clearly play an 
important role for the decision to be taken. Bidders are for example encouraged to 
suggest changes to time tables in order to save on costs and/or to improve on the value-
of-services for users.  
 
There are also economic incentives linked to operator performance. The following 
description is taken from the Öresundstrafiken contract, but the structure is similar also 
elsewhere. 
 
Each month, the operator is required to account for punctuality. Failure to submit a report 
is penalised at a rate of SEK 10 000 per occasion. Category 1 is defined to be trains on 
time, 2 between 1 and 3 minutes late; 3 between 3 an 10 minutes; 4 up to 20 minutes; and 
5 more than 20 minutes late or cancelled train. Different targets are set for peak and off 
peak periods. 
 
 
 Peak period, % Category Off peak, %  
A 98 1+2 96  
B 99 1+2+3 98  
C 100 1+2+3+4 100  
D 0 5 0  
Table x  
 
Traveller surveys are made twice a year. Bonuses and deductions are made at SEK 0,25 
per passenger when customer quality is above or below a set target. The franchisee is 
furthermore penalised by SEK 5 000 each time on-board staff are missing. The following 
penalties also apply: 
 
• Failure to inform travellers about trains which are more than three minutes late: 
SEK 1 000 per occasion. 
• Incomplete information about revenue from ticket sales: SEK 5 000 per occasion. 
• Late accounting for ticket sales: SEK 1 000 per day late. 
• Failure to charge travellers in the right way: SEK 1 000 per occasion. 
 
 
5. FARES 
 
In Britain, the franchise agreement specifies certain fares that are regulated, and restricts 
increases in those fares to the increase in the retail price index plus or minus a certain per 
cent. In the original franchises, this percentage was -1%, but in recent franchises it has 
been + 1%. The Rail Regulator does not regulate rail fares (except in respect of his 
general competition duties concerning abuse of dominant position). Exceptionally, in the 
case of South East Trains, a higher level of increase has been permitted because of the 
improvement in service resulting from the use of the new high speed line to London.  
 
The government justified this policy of raising real fares in the 2008 White Paper (DfT, 
2008) on the basis that the increase in costs in the industry had led to a situation in which 
passengers were only paying some 50% of the industry’s costs, and that it was fair to 
restore this to something like 75% over a number of years.   
 
For short distance and commuter services, it is season tickets that are regulated under the 
above arrangement; for long distance services it is the off peak ticket previously known 
as the saver. Around half of rail passenger revenue comes from regulated fares, but this 
proportion is much higher for commuter services and lower for long distance services. 
Over the period 1995-2008, rail fares rose on average by 4.5% in real terms in London 
and the South East, by 4.7% on regional services and by 31.1% on long distance. Whilst 
regulated fares fell by 1.6% over this period, unregulated standard class fares rose by 
20.7% and first class fares by 52.8% (ORR, 2009). 
 
As well as actually raising individual fares, franchisees can raise the average level of 
fares by limiting the hours in which cheaper ticket types are available – several operators, 
including First Capital Connect and South West Trains, have been criticised for doing 
this, although they have responded that it helps make better use of limited capacity by 
directing passengers to less heavily crowded trains. 
 
All train operating companies are required to accept inter available tickets, the fares for 
which are set by the leading train operator on the route in question. The revenue from 
such tickets is shared according to a model (ORCATTS) which predicts the relative use 
of the different operators. In addition they can offer advanced purchase tickets for use on 
specific trains; obviously in this case the operator of that train receives all the revenue. 
Operators other than the lead operator can offer operator specific tickets at a lower fare, 
leading to some fares competition where franchises overlap. For instance, First Capital 
Connect offers lower fares between Peterborough and London than the inter available 
fare set by National Express East Coast. Open access services, operated not under a 
franchise agreement and without subsidy but also without requirement to pay a premium 
for the franchise or to contribute to the fixed costs of the infrastructure, may also be 
permitted. Invariably open access operators offer lower fares than the franchisee. 
 
The other recent development relating to fares policy is the so called simplification which 
came into effect in 2008. Originally, whilst franchises were required to continue to offer 
the standard inter-available tickets, they could also choose to introduce their own tickets, 
and this happened, leading to a diversity of tickets with different names and conditions 
from TOC to TOC. To reduce confusion, the TOCs agreed last year to restrict their ticket 
types to a limited number with standardised names such as ‘anytime’, ‘off peak’, ‘super 
off peak’ and ‘advance’. However, a particular type of ticket may still have different 
conditions, for instance on when it may be used, attached to it according to the TOC in 
question, and this –plus the fact that a large proportion of ticket types were renamed – 
may actually have created confusion.    
 
In Sweden, fares are generally set by the franchising authority with little scope for the 
operator to affect levels. One exception for this is the contract for Tåg I Bergslagen, 
which is referred to as a net cost contract. Access to all ticket purchases is available 
through a national data base, TågPlus. Total ticket price for trips including both a 
commercial and a subsidised component may be expensive since there is no policy for 
marketing and selling these as a comprehensive package.  
     
According to Alexandersson and Hulten (2007) there has been a substantial rise in rail 
fares in Sweden, averaging 43% over the period 1988-2003, with even higher increases 
for regional services. 
 
6. ROLLING STOCK PROCUREMENT 
 
In Britain, choice of rolling stock to use on a franchise in principle rests with the TOC, 
which procures the rolling stock almost invariably via a commercial rolling stock leasing 
company (ROSCO). The rolling stock must be able to fulfil the terms of the franchise 
agreement, which will limit the choice in terms in particular of route availability and 
performance. Choice of stock is mainly an issue at the franchise letting stage, as TOCs 
will normally enter into a leasing agreement binding them to particular rolling stock 
throughout the franchise in order to secure the best possible terms. 
 
There will only be an incentive to use new rolling stock if the combination of additional 
revenue plus savings in costs (though lower fuel and maintenance costs and/or improved 
availability and/or track access charges) outweighs any increased leasing costs plus other 
costs involved in the replacement such as crew training and the need to retain existing 
stock on a short lease during the changeover. DfT approval is required for all leasing 
agreements related to franchises, but DfT rarely uses this as a way of getting involved in 
negotiations over price. 
 
Sometimes DfT requires that existing rolling stock is used, either because it has other 
plans regarding replacement (e.g. where the new inter city trains on which it is leading 
procurement are to be used) or where it has given the ROSCO a binding commitment that 
the existing stock will be re-used (in order to secure a lower annual rental). 
 
As a result of a complaint from DfT , the Competition Commission has investigated 
whether the actions of the ROSCOs regarding the pricing of the rolling stock which they 
inherited at privatization constitute an abuse of market power.  (Competition 
Commission, 2009).  The Competition Commission considered that the current 
franchising procedures did give market power to the ROSCOs, and that longer franchises 
should be considered. The reason for this is that there is seldom any choice of stock at the 
start of a franchise; the only real competition comes through the possibility of introducing 
new stock but that would at best take some years.  
 
From the point of view of the TOC, in considering whether to introduce new rolling 
stock, and if it does do so, in considering whether to choose anything other than the 
cheapest, it will only consider any benefits within the period of its existing franchise 
agreement (i.e. usually 7 years, with a possible 3 year extension to which some 
consideration might be given). It will use a commercial discount rate. Longer franchises 
would increase the incentives on train operating companies to consider new rolling stock.  
 
What is crucial with current franchise length is the degree to which the rolling stock 
leasing company is prepared to offer a price which reflects the benefits of the new rolling 
stock over its full anticipated life of at least thirty years. Obviously in considering this, 
they will use a commercial discount rate with a risk premium reflecting the risk that the 
stock will not be released, or will only be released at a substantial discount, at the end of 
the existing franchise. The evidence is that for very flexible diesel units, they are willing 
to take this risk, but for more specialized units, including those tied to a particular 
electrification system (Britain has two – third rail and overhead) they are not. Thus for a 
substantial proportion of new rolling stock, the Department for Transport has given a 
commitment that it will be reused, meaning that it is in effect the body concerned with 
minimising life cycle costs, rather than the train operating company or the leasing 
company.     
   
In considering the case for new stock, DfT might take into account benefits beyond the 
period of the current franchise, although it is quoted by the Competition Commission 
(2008) as not usually doing so (but presumably if it gave a commitment on future use of 
the rolling stock it would). It would also presumably use a social discount rate.  
  
In practice, a number of factors have led to the Department for Transport taking a much 
more prominent role in rolling stock procurement in recent years. Partly this has resulted 
from a positive decision to try to overcome the incentive problem outlined above, and 
partly it has resulted from a lack of willingness of the ROSCOs to invest, in the face of 
the financial difficulties of the banking industry (which owns the ROSCOs) and the 
particular uncertainties referred to above. The result is that the Department for Transport 
is now taking the lead in procuring new trains, including setting up its own leasing 
company to procure and lease the fleet of diesel trains most recently announced. 
 
Since the start of the 1988 organizational reforms, rolling stock ownership in Sweden has 
been concentrated in a few public sector bodies. First and foremost, SJ owns (or controls 
through sale-leaseback deals) all rolling stock that is required for its commercial traffic. 
Secondly, the respective regional franchising bodies have been the owner of some 
vehicles that were used specifically for traffic within the respective regions at the split. 
Third, Affärsverket SJ was created by the government to manage all rolling stock which 
was not to be used by SJ or which was not assigned to a particular region. This was a way 
to relieve these two organizations from risks relating to redundant rolling stock. 
Affärsverket SJ leases existing stock on a cost recovery basis but is not authorized to 
purchase new vehicles.  
 
In 1999, most franchising agencies set up a jointly owned subsidiary – Transitio AB – for 
the purchase and ownership of rolling stock. The respective agencies then lease their 
rolling stock on a cost recovery basis. Except for benefiting from scale economies in 
standardization and purchase of vehicles, the company also handles heavy vehicle 
maintenance, owns spare parts and holds a couple of vehicles of each brand as a backup. 
Although vehicle purchase is channeled through Transitio, the respective regions still 
owns the vehicles they use, and some purchases bypass Transitio.  
 
No commercial vehicle leasing activity has been established. One reason is probably that 
the risk premium in the interest paid through Transitio is so small that commercial 
leasehold would not be competitive.  Since about 2001, the government has also been 
subsidizing the regions’ purchase of new rolling stock.  
 
 
7. RELATIONS WITH THE INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGER 
 
In Britain, a train operating company winning a franchise negotiates a track access 
agreement with the infrastructure manager to cover the period of the franchise. This 
bestows a right to a certain amount of capacity on the TOC, but the slots are defined with 
a degree of flexing permitted; that is to say the timetable can be modified by moving a 
train a certain number of minutes earlier or later than its current slot in order to 
accommodate other services. There is an annual timetabling round in which TOCs may 
propose changes or request additional slots. The infrastructure manager is required to 
follow a set of criteria in considering priorities which take account both of the social 
costs and benefits of the service and of practical issues such as continuity. There is an 
appeals committee composed of users of the line, and ultimately dissatisfied TOCs may 
appeal to the Regulator. 
 
The existing contractual arrangements in Britain include a number of incentive 
mechanisms designed to influence the behaviour of the train operating company. The first 
of these is the level of infrastructure charges. For franchisees, these are levied according 
to a multi part tariff. A fixed charge reflects a share of the fixed costs of the network, but 
is of no particular significance in terms of incentives, as it presumably simply affects the 
level of the bid in terms of subsidy or premium. The usage charge is levied per vehicle 
kilometre on the basis of estimated wear and tear cost and includes a high degree of 
differentiation according to the characteristics of the rolling stock, distinguishing several 
hundred types of stock on the basis of characteristics such as unsprung mass and 
axleload. There is also a congestion charge, which varies by service group, a charge for 
electricity and a charge for the use of stations. 
 
The second important incentive mechanism is the performance regime, which requires 
train operators to pay Network Rail for delays they cause, thus incentivising reliability. In 
turn, Network Rail compensates TOCs for other delays, including those for which 
Network Rail are responsible themselves and those caused by other TOCs. The intention 
is that any revenue shortfall caused by poor performance due to factors not under the 
control of the TOC will be made up for by these payments.  
 
Changes in track access charges during the course of a franchise are simply passed 
through to the state in a change in subsidy or premium and do not affect the financial 
position of the TOC. When refranchising occurs presumably the level of track access 
charges again simply leads to an equivalent change in the level of bids.  As noted above, 
the TOC is also substantially protected from failings in performance by the infrastructure 
manager by compensation under the performance regime. The result is that TOC bears 
little risk in regard to the infrastructure manager but also has limited incentive to press 
them on matters of cost and performance. In the British structure, this is made up for by a 
strong regulator who does indeed press the infrastructure manager hard on these issues, 
and ultimately has powers including not just control of charges but also fines. 
    
In Sweden there is no long term track access agreement, but TOCs generally expect to be 
able to retain the slots they need to operate the service they are contracted to run. The 
franchising agency is basically responsible for annual negotiations with Banverket for the 
precise time table, but may be assisted in this by the franchisee. There is an important 
difference between regional train services, where capacity often is available during much 
of the day, and commuter services. Stockholm’s commuter train system is, for instance, 
decisive for much of the pattern of time tables also in the rest of the country. Capacity 
shortages in that region for instance means that the commuter trains can not be operated 
with six departures, which is the actual demand, but four departures per hour during peak 
periods. 
 
Infrastructure charges in Sweden are much simpler than in Britain, being based largely on 
the estimated wear and tear cost per gross tonne kilometre. Sweden currently has no  
performance regime, although its introduction is required under Directive 2001/14. 
Sweden does now have a regulator, the Swedish Rail Authority, but it is more involved in 
technical matters and in hearing appeals than in enforcement of efficiency and 
performance of the infrastructure manager. 
 
We mentioned above that in Britain open access competition may be permitted. The 
decision on open access is that of the Regulator, whose policy is only to admit such 
services if they offer real consumer benefits and generate new rail traffic rather than 
simply abstracting passengers from existing services. There are now several such 
services, the longest lived being those of Hull Trains between London and Hull. Where 
there are more operators wishing to run services than the capacity will permit, as is 
currently the case on the East Coast Main Line, it is for the regulator to decide the best 
use of capacity. In fact, the regulator has recently allowed two additional open access 
competitors on the East Coast Main Line. In Sweden, to date, commercial services have 
been an SJ monopoly, but it is now proposed to allow open access to competitors. 
 
In short, in both Britain and Sweden, the infrastructure manager is a not for profit 
organisation with charges based on marginal costs (except for the fixed charge in 
Britain). In neither case does the structure encourage the TOCs to press the infrastructure 
manager on matters of efficiency; whereas Britain does have a strong regulator to 
perform that function, in Sweden the regulatory function is also relatively weak. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have contrasted the franchising arrangements in Britain and Sweden. In 
Sweden, franchising comprises the procurement of services specified by central or 
regional government, at fares set by them and using rolling stock procured by them.   
Contracts are generally gross cost with incentive payments based on performance.  The 
aim of the franchising system is basically to ensure that the services are run cost 
effectively, and by and large the evidence is that this has succeeded, with a typical saving 
of subsidy of the order of 20-30% being achieved at the first round of franchising and 
largely maintained thereafter (Alexandersson and Hulten, 2007). Moreover, there has 
been a major increase in services and traffic, although doubts have been expressed as to 
whether services are always planned and marketed to the greatest advantage, and it has 
been argued that involving operators more strongly in this rather than leaving it entirely 
to the franchising authorities would be advantageous. The continued presence of SJ in the 
market has also been problematic, in that it has apparently attempted predatory 
behaviour, although if it is now a genuine arms-length commercial organisation which 
cannot expect to be baled out by the government if things go wrong then perhaps that is 
no longer a problem. 
 
By contrast, franchising in Britain appears both more ambitious and more problematic. 
The aim has been to leave TOCs more commercial freedom to influence services, fares, 
marketing and rolling stock procurement, although this freedom has diminished over the 
years. The principal incentive in this process is that the TOCs bear at least a degree of 
revenue risk. There is evidence of success in that traffic has grown fast, and there is some 
evidence that whilst most of this is due to external factors such as economic growth and 
road congestion these factors do not explain all the growth. But costs have risen 
substantially; real train operating costs per train km in 2005-6 being 15% higher than in 
1996/7 at the start of the franchising process, and 35% higher than at their lowest point in 
1999/2000 (Smith, Nash and Wheat, 2009),  although it is not clear how far this should 
be seen as a failure of the franchising system as opposed to being caused by other factors. 
 
What is the efficient way to split risk between the state and the franchisee, accounting for the 
need to provide incentives to be both cost efficient and to cap risk? There is a vast literature on 
this topic, which generally argues that risks should be allocated to the party best equipped to 
manage them. Thus cost risks are generally allocated to the franchisee, although some aspects 
(e.g. developments in fuel and labour prices in general, as opposed to the precise agreements 
struck by the franchisee) may be outside their control and in some contracts general increases in 
these costs are passed on to the state. Revenue risks are more complicated. Whilst they may be 
influenced by the quality of service of the agent, they are generally much more related to external 
factors such as the state of the economy. Given its size, the public sector is better positioned to 
carry such risks. If they do not carry them, this will affect the competitiveness of the bids 
received in the first place, and the likelihood of a franchisee failing, in which case the state is 
likely to pick up much of the costs anyway.  
 
In practice there seems to be a simple choice. Where the task is simply to run a 
predefined level of service in a cost effective way, the Swedish approach of gross cost 
contracts with performance payments seems to work well. But if it is desired to give the 
TOC some commercial freedom a lot more thought is required. The current British 
system involves a number of complicated incentive mechanisms, but it is not clear that 
these are fully effective. 
 
We have already seen a number of arguments for longer franchises. These would improve 
the incentives for both developing services and for cutting costs. They would enable the 
TOC to play a more active role in rolling stock procurement and perhaps also in putting 
pressure on the infrastructure management, although to make this effective would mean 
relating the fixed element of the infrastructure charge more closely to the avoidable cost 
of the services of the TOC, and making the TOC bear the risk of changes in infrastructure 
charges. They would also reduce the costs of the franchising process itself; each 
franchising exercise has been estimated to cost bidders of the order of £15m (National 
Audit Office, 2008). Obviously there would have to be penalties, and ultimately the risk 
of losing the franchise prematurely for poor performance. 
 
A further problem with the current system is that TOCs have little capital invested in the 
system, and are able to surrender the franchise with a relatively low penalty (in terms of 
the performance bond) if things go wrong. Thus may in turn encourage optimistic 
bidding. Other than increasing the size of the performance bond, an alternative would be 
to make the TOC more likely to invest directly in the franchise, and this would be easier 
to achieve with a longer franchise.  
 
Of course a longer contract would expose the operator to even greater revenue risks, 
which would increase the risk of failure, and discourage competitive bids if the penalty 
for surrendering a franchise were substantially increased. So some form of revenue 
protection in the event of an economic downturn would be an essential part of such a 
system.   
 
A strong counter argument rests with the difficulty of incentivising the TOC to undertake 
improvements both to services themselves and to related facilities, such as car parking 
and stations, which may be socially desirable but unprofitable. Even in a short franchise 
this is a difficulty, and such improvements are often heavily prescribed in franchise 
agreements leading to accusations of micro management, but in long franchises they 
would of necessity have to be revised periodically; they could not all be foreseen at the 
start of the franchise. A solution here is to move to paying a subsidy according to the 
amount of traffic attracted; the level of the subsidy can be varied according to the social 
benefits in question, so for instance higher on peak period commuter services than off 
peak. Whilst in itself this would increase the revenue risk borne by the franchisee, if they 
were protected from some of the impact of an economic downturn, the net effect may not 
be problematic in terms of the impact on bids and on the likelihood of failure..  
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alexandersson G and Hulten S (2007) Competitive tendering of regional and inter 
regional rail services in Sweden  In ECMT, Competitive tendering of rail services, Paris, 
165-188  
 
Competition Commission (2009) Rolling stock leasing. London 
 
Department for Transport (2006): A guide to the rail franchising procurement process, 
London. 
 
Department for Transport (2007): Delivering a Sustainable Railway, London 
 
National Audit Office (2008) Department for Transport: Letting Rail Franchises 2005-7 
 
Office of Rail Regulation (2009)  National Rail Trends 
 
Smith, ASJ, Nash CA and Wheat P (2009) Passenger rail franchising in Britain: has it 
been a success? International Journal of Transport Economics 36 (1) 33-62 
 
Wardman, M. (2006) Demand for Rail Travel and the Effects of External Factors. 
Transportation Research E, 42 (3), pp.129-148 
 
Appendix A  Current Franchises, Great Britain 
 
TOC Owning Group Year 
Awarded 
Train km (2007-8) 
(m) 
Pass km (2007-8) 
(m) 
Length 
Long distance services 
Cross Country Arriva 2007 50.2 1136.6 6 (+2) 
East Midlands Stagecoach 2007 10.1 1597.9 6 (+2) 
First Great Western First 2006 44.8 4985.9 7 (+3) 
National Express East Coast National Express 2007 18.81 4301.91 6 (+2) 
Virgin West Coast Virgin 20062 23.4 4213.5 152 
London and South East Services 
C2C National Express 1996 6.4 916.8 15 
Chiltern Deutsche Bahn (Germany) 2000 9.3 897.1 20 
First Capital Connect First 2006 23.9 3212.3 6 (+3) 
Gatwick Express Go-ahead/Via Rail (France)  2.4 219.5  
London Overground Deutsche Bahn/MTR (Hong Kong)  1.3 162.1  
National Express East Anglia National Express 2004 31.4 3946.0 7 (+3) 
South East Trains Go-ahead/Via Rail (France) 2006 28.8 3844.2 6 (+2) 
Southern Go-ahead/Via Rail (France) 2003 28.1 3421.9 6 
South West Trains Stagecoach 2007 40.7 5185.1 7 (+3) 
Regional Services 
Arriva Trains Wales Arriva 2003 23.7 953.3 15 
First Scotrail First 2004 38.7 2503.8 7 (+3) 
London Midland Go-ahead/Via Rail  2007 7.0 591.5 6 (+2) 
Merseyrail SERCO/Nedrail (Netherlands) 2003 6.0 341.8 25 
Northern SERCO/Nedrail (Netherlands) 2004 48.2 1831.9 7 (+2) 
Trans Pennine Express First/Keolia (France) 2004 14.4 1069.5 8 (+5) 
 
Source:  ORR National Rail Trends; DfT Website 
 
1 Data refers to 2006-7, when the TOC was GNER 
 
2 15 year franchise awarded starting 1997, suspended due to the failure of Railtrack to deliver the necessary infrastructure 
improvements in 2002; reinstated in 2006. 
Appendix B  Current Franchises, Sweden. 
 
Name of service 
(Ri – procured by 
Rikstrafiken) 
Commuter/ 
Regional 
Procurement/ 
Negotiated 
contract 
(Year of 
contracting) 
Operator Contract 
size, 
million 
train km 
Contract 
size, 
million 
passenger 
km, 2008 
Rikstrafiken 
subsidy, m 
SEK 2008 
Contract 
length, 
years + 
option 
No. of 
bidders,  
first 
round/second  
round 
Kustpilen R P (2007) Veolia 1,9 0,56 22 6+2 4/4 
Östgötapendeln C N (?) SJ ?   ? N.a. 
Tåg i Bergslagen R P (2005) Tågkompaniet 5,5 2,6 64 5+5 6/3 
Tåg i Mälardalen R N (?) SJ ? 1,5 17 ? N.a. 
Värmlandstrafik 1 R N (2003) Merresor 1,2   3+2 N.a. 
Värmlandstrafik 2 
(Genvägen) 
R  Tågkompaniet  0,02 2   
Värmlandstrafik 3 
(Örebro – Oslo) 
R  ?      
Krösatåget R P (2001) BK Tåg, 
Merresor from 
2005 
2,2 1,3 30 5+0 ?/2 
Coast-to-Coast R N (?) SJ N.a.  - Indefinite/ 
taken 
over by 
SJ 
n.a. 
Pågatåg C/R P (2005) Arriva 3,5  - 9+2 9/5 
Support to Blekinge 
– Öresund 
    1,6 17   
Öresundståg C/R P (2007) Öresundståg   - 7+2 12/5 
Stockholm 
commuter trains 
C P (2005) Stockholmståg ?  - 5+5 ?/6 
Roslagsbanan C P (2002) Roslagståg ?  - 5+5 ?/4 
Upptåget C/R P (2005) SJ   - 5+5 6/3 
Kinnekullebanan R P (2008) Veolia 0,8  (85) 4+2 ?/5 
Bohusbanan R P (2003) SJ 0,9  (85) 3+3 ?/2 
Rikstrafiken 
support to 
Gothenburg region 
    6,4 85   
Alingsåspendeln C N (?) SJ ?  - 25 years n.a. 
Kungsbackapendeln C N (?) SJ ?  - 25 years n.a. 
X-tåget R P (1999) Tågkompaniet   - 8+5 ?/4 
Sleeper trains to 
Norrland (Ri) 
R P (2007) Norrlandståg  545 109   
Day trains Norrland R P (2007) Norrlandståg  74 13   
Mitt-Nabo (Ri) R P Veolia  2 135 55   
 
